DAY ONE
Introductions and Welcome
Participants were welcomed to this meeting to discuss the G20 and civil society responses to past and future summits. The objectives of the meeting were to:

- Build knowledge of the policy agendas at play at the G20;
- Build a greater understanding of the strategic role of the G20 and determine the most effective ways to relate to it;
- Build bridges with regional, national, and international groups to develop collaborative capacity in relation to the G20;
- Develop ideas and proposals for collaboration with our South Korean colleagues on the upcoming events in Seoul, and articulate messages for the current summit in Toronto.

Review of Objectives and Process
Although the focus of the meeting was to create dialogue and encourage a diversity of opinion on the G20 as an institution and the issues it was addressing, the hope was to develop concrete proposals by the end of the sessions in terms of working together on the issues. For example, a mapping exercise detailing national, regional and international civil society engagement and perspectives on the G20 and its area of focus had been developed prior to the meeting. It was hoped that the meeting would help fill in the mapping document, and then establish it as a common resource that could be updated regularly by different groups. The meeting was also intended as a first step in a series of future discussions on G20 summit issues to be continued in South Korea and France, building a “triumvirate” between past, present and future groups active on the G20.

Part 1: Defining Strategic Civil Society Goals and Desired Outcomes for Organizing Around the G20
This session focused on broad G20 governance issues and the desired outcomes of civil society engagement with the G20. The discussion was guided by a set of questions (available in the meeting concept note and agenda), from which the following core issues emerged:
Legitimacy
It is important to continue to challenge the G20 as an illegitimate and unrepresentative body. Although, the G20 does include more countries than the G8, it still excludes most countries in the global South. It may be more practical and useful to have a smaller number of world leaders assembling to discuss global economic issues, but while this may make it potentially more effective as a governing body, it does not give it any more legitimacy. Its global mandate was decided by its own small membership and key interests were missing from the table. Could South Africa really advance the interests of Africa (and would it want to), or India of South Asia?

Some noted that the ILO’s participation in recent G20 meetings, and the participation of the UN Secretary General at the Toronto Summit, suggested that UN agencies might be able to influence the G20’s agenda in the future. This in turn could strengthen ties to the UN and its global membership, possibly granting the G20 more legitimacy. Some participants felt that this bridge to the UN was insufficient, and encouraged pursuing in parallel the reforms suggested by the Stiglitz Commission for a Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC) within the UN.

Many also raised concerns about the IMF in the context of the G20. In the absence of a formal secretariat, the IMF seems poised to play this role as an ad hoc secretariat, in particular given how much the G20 has strengthened the IMF’s role in global economic governance. Most agreed the IMF should not be the central institution overseeing G20 financial matters.

Monitoring the implementation of current decisions, while pressing a more forward looking, transformative agenda
The discussion also focused on the need to apply strategic pressure for better international financial regulation, effective multilateral supervision, equitable redistribution of resources, a system of international reserves, a reduction in the dependency on the dollar and in negative interdependency on trade. It was noted that campaigning organizations should focus simultaneously on both long-term fundamental change, including the UN-proposed Economic Coordination Council and a new global reserve system, as well as more pragmatic, short-term, winnable goals such as the financial transactions tax, pushing progress on the MDGs and including the African Union in the G20. Medium to long term goals always remain medium to long term unless groups agree to press their adoption in the short term. Broad coalitions of groups focusing on both types of goals could work to mutually reinforce one another.

The G20 ‘Unanimity of Purpose’
The Group also discussed whether they should work to restrict the focus of the G20 to purely economic issues, keeping a narrow focus on its self-proclaimed role as the ‘premier forum for international economic cooperation’, or encourage the G20 to expand its focus to broader development and climate issues. The group recognized that all three were not mutually exclusive, but expanding the G20’s focus to this broader set of issues necessarily increased the institutions influence over setting the agenda on the issues. It also diverted attention away from monitoring other organizations outside of the G20 (OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and the UN) where debate on these issues was already under way and is moving the agenda forward. No clear consensus was reached in terms of expanding or restricting the G20’s agenda, but some felt that the G20 could be used strategically to move the debate forward or help kick-start conversations in other forum.

Some people also questioned the ability of the G20, since April 2009, to actually cooperate and
coordinate efforts on many issues, pointing to unilateral decisions made in Europe and the US in terms of regulation, bank taxes, banning the trade of certain financial assets, etc. Most could find little evidence of much recent “cooperation” at the G20, and many argued the Toronto summit would be a test of its coordinating capacity. [It would appear that this hypothesis is starting to find some supporting evidence with little beyond tax deficit and debt reduction targets agreed in Toronto.]

Perhaps much of the disharmony of opinions on issues within the G20 can be explained by the fact that only a few countries have opinions on a select range of issues. Many new G20 member countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Argentina have not yet defined their agendas. This might provide a political opportunity for civil society in those countries to play a more active role in helping to shape those agendas. It might be effective to strategically target the governments of these countries to advance issues that are not currently on the table. At the very least, civil society in these countries could create certain expectations of outcomes for their governments, challenging their government’s role, engagement and action within the G20.

**The Movement from G8 to G20: Old Wine in a New Bottle?**

Participants saw a need to critically assess whether the G20 was a forum that was simply reinforcing current global balances of power vs. something that could challenge this balance. More countries are now at the table, but there is risk that divergent agendas and opinions may simply be coopted by the G8 (under the shroud of the G20). In the past, the “Outreach Five” (Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa and China) made joint statements that were quite radical relative to the G20. However, now that these countries are part of the club, it is much harder for them to criticize the outcomes of the G20 – a club of which they are now members. In this respect, the G20 could be a device for divide and rule. Others said that the reason the G8 was expanded to the G20 during a time of financial crisis was not to be more reflective of a changing global economy, but rather to bring to the table countries with more extensive foreign reserves and all the G8’s foreign debt! Most agreed that to shift the global balance of power, all governments must be included or at the very least, a system established to have countries represented on a constituency basis.

**A new era?**

Some thought that perhaps we weren’t fully appreciating the significance of the move from the G8 to G20. The G20 represents the end of an obsolete cold war group, and it is not yet fully defined. This presents a unique opportunity to influence an emerging agenda that may have a real impact on the lives of poor people. The G20 may have decided that it is the premier forum for global economic cooperation, but clearly it overstated its role at the time; and the lack of unanimity of purpose confirms this. This means that it is in much more of a state of flux, and open to influence, than many of us actually appreciate.

**Democracy**

In terms of the G8 and democracy, some participants argued the G20 was merely an elite club of rich countries representing global capital, and a move away from charter-based international institutions. The interests of the poor are neglected, while the interests of capital continue to dominate. “The gains have been privatized and the costs socialized”. Again there was a call for a more inclusive system, representative of all countries.
Part 2: Strategic Analysis of G20 and G20 Agenda – regional and national mapping with respect to the G20

This section mapped national and regional experiences in terms of engaging (or not) with the G20 and priority issues (on the G20’s agenda) from a national and regional perspective. It addressed questions put forth in the mapping exercise. In general, the discussion revealed varying degrees of civil society mobilization on these issues with, not surprisingly, significantly less degree of engagement in the non-G8 G20. Economic and financial literacy among civil society across most countries seemed to be a challenge, as well as gaining access to government officials to discuss these issues. The following provides an extremely brief summary. More detailed mapping information can be found at http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/content/bridge-south-korea-global-civil-society-meeting-g20.

**Latin American Perspectives:**
There are a large number of civil society organizations (CSOs) and trade union organizations active across Latin America engaged in G20 and international finance issues. Common target issues in Latin America include exploring a new global/regional financial architecture, ensuring regional policy autonomy, monitoring the IMF and its role in the G20, implementing regional capital controls, controlling tax havens and ensuring environmental protection.

There are understandable variances in the political context across countries, permitting different degrees of CSO and public mobilization on these issues. Some common challenges include a lack of economic and financial literacy within CSOs and the public at large, presenting international financial issues in a meaningful way to ordinary people, political repression and silencing of critical voices in many Latin American countries (like Mexico), and a general lack of government transparency vis-à-vis their engagement in the G20.

**African Perspectives:**
Some groups in South Africa are still grappling with the G20’s agenda and determining how best to engage. However, there are a number of national, regional and international coalitions working closely on G20 issues. Some central issues being pursued include: African representation in the G20, maintaining or increasing the flow of aid and development finance from G8 countries, pursuing inclusive economic growth, ensuring fair trade, regulating the financial sector, promoting the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), ensuring climate justice and reducing maternal mortality.

Like Latin America, the G20 is not a serious issue for many African CSOs, because ordinary people see little connection between their daily struggles and the G20. Like in Latin America, this could change by building knowledge and economic literacy. For many CSOs in Africa, this lack of literacy provides challenges to articulating specific policy positions on G20 issues.

There are a number of political challenges in Africa as well. While South Africa’s participation in the G20 provides some level of representation for Africa, it obviously does not reflect the diverse interests of the continent. Regulatory capture (by the financial sector) was also noted as a possible problem in South Africa, where the current government continues to subscribe to a largely neoliberal agenda. Government repression in countries such as Malawi was also noted as being a significant challenge.
Asian Perspectives:
CSO activity in Asia on G20 issues is quite mixed. For example, in India there has been some mobilization amongst neoliberal think-tanks and business organizations, but trade union and social movement responses to G20 issues have been relatively superficial. In Japan there is minimal CSO activity, and trade union activity is fairly conservative. Similarly, mobilizing civil society in China is challenging, and existing organizations are quite weak. Other Asian G20 members including Indonesia and South Korea have higher degrees of CSO activity but most Asian countries overall have found it difficult to mobilize citizens on G20 issues. Again, a lack of literacy on the issues and their relationship to ordinary people’s lives was cited as a major challenge. Some other challenges include a lack of government transparency and openness, the existence of government-backed CSOs who tow party lines, government repression, and in some areas, a lack of CSO funding.

Some of the issues being confronted by organizations in Asia include: climate change, IFI governance, development finance, the FTT, and promoting the MDGs.

International Organizations:
International organizations including global civil society actors and trade union organizations are active in all G20 member countries, campaigning on a wide range of issues including: development finance, capacity building and education, innovative financing, climate change, IFI reform, G20 governance, MDG attainment, and IFI monitoring amongst others.

These organizations are also quite active in coalition building with regional partners and helping to improve economic literacy and capacity in local and regional CSOs.

Learning and Strategy Session #1: Public Finance Policy including the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth
This section began with a presentation by Peter Chowla from the Bretton Woods Project, giving an overview of some of the central issues on the public policy side of regulating finance, with specific reference to the G20’s IMF-coordinated “Global Framework” initiative for revitalizing the world economy. This program is intended to ensure financial policy coherence across G20 countries. On the surface, it seems a reasonable strategy. However, the initiative is subject to serious coordination problems, lacks a coherent plan toward low-carbon economies, and continues to promote potentially harmful structural adjustment policies. The full presentation is at: http://halifaxinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Bridge%20to%20S%20Korea%20presentation%20-%20Peter.ppt

Input from others on priority issues, strategic opportunities and divisions within the G20:
Peter identified what he thought were key priorities for groups to focus on in terms of the G20. This included continuing to challenge structural adjustment and austerity programs, now in both the North and South, whether induced by the failure of the market or by the IMF. Both were seen to be at the expense of the public and offered an opportunity, particularly now in the North, for awareness raising and mobilizing people with respect to the IMF’s practices. He also encouraged groups to challenge the unrepresentative, exclusive, opaque and unaccountable nature of the G20 and to democratize IFI governance. In the longer term, he encouraged groups to focus on a transition towards low carbon growth, the implementation of an international capital control framework and a new international monetary system.
In general, many people highlighted the importance of exploiting the tensions within the G20 to find spaces where consensus does not yet exist and targeting these areas to influence the agenda.

**Short, Medium and Long Term Priorities**

In the short term, it is important to confront the new role the IMF seems to be taking in handling the crises in Europe and around the world as the *de facto* G20 secretariat, and to actively monitor its rising influence within the G8/G20.

In the medium to long-term it was argued that we should restore the state’s regulatory capacity to protect the rights of citizens. Regulatory and legislative capture by the financial industry (and capture of economic theory and economics by finance) was highlighted a number of times in the discussion as a potentially serious issue. CSOs need to confront the fact that private interests control the very governments and elected officials that are supposed to be regulating them. Some argued that the current crisis has effectively allowed the financial sector to privatize the gains while socializing the losses, and this will inevitably lead to social instability and environmental degradation. The question then becomes, how do we re-capture states.

Some wondered if our short, medium and long-term priorities have taken for granted a static context, ignoring the possibility of further crises and another recession. There was a sense we should position our analyses in this reality (that deflation and default could bring a double dip recession), and be more strategic and more demanding. To cope with these threats we should insist on immediate regulation and capital controls, and urge fundamental changes to the international monetary system instead of pursuing incremental reform. Others also noted that we should integrate some of our “medium” and “long” term priorities into our short term focus. Otherwise we never focus on these issues since they always remain long term goals.

Groups also agreed to continue to explore and support regional initiatives like the *Chiang Mai Initiative* and *Mercosur* to help address the crisis.

Others argued that a short, medium, and long-term priority should be to maintain and sustain world peace. Looking at how wars evolve historically, they are often the result of not effectively resolving crises.

**DAY TWO**

**Learning and Strategy Session #2: Private Finance Policy**

This session featured a presentation by Aniket Bhushan from *The North South Institute* covering issues at the core (issues that were the cause of the crisis and need addressing) and periphery (not a direct cause of the crisis, but which the crisis has exposed as needing to be addressed) of financial regulation. The presentation gave an outline of the key reforms in play, and how the speed, scale, and sweeping nature of many of these regulations could pose major coordination challenges. Aniket argued that these broad regulations may in fact result in a kind of ‘regulatory chaos’ (regulatory arbitrage, contradictions in regulation, overreach of regulation, and lack of global coordination) that could provoke the next crisis. The full presentation is at: [http://halifaxinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Financial%20reform%20and%20regulation%20G20%20(Toronto).ppt](http://halifaxinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Financial%20reform%20and%20regulation%20G20%20(Toronto).ppt)
**Input from others on priority issues, strategic opportunities and divisions within the G20:**
Aniket did not identify any specific priority issues, but rather suggested the civil society frame their demands around what a responsible financial system and sector might look like.

**Campaignable Issues**
Most believed the FTT remained a campaignable issue, although a few were skeptical about whether the tax is capable of curbing speculation. A graduated capital gains tax system was proposed as an alternative. Some saw a need for immediate control over things like hedge funds and complex investment products, and a decrease in the scale of finance to reduce global exposure to speculative attacks. There was no agreement on whether national, regional or global regulations would best fill the regulatory gap, but it was clear that anything global would be the lowest common denominator, with a definite need for strong national regulation and robust regulatory oversight. Some argued this should remain a regional conversation. Someone also suggested incorporating environmental and social risk exposure into regulatory frameworks, to compel disclosure of potentially negative climate or social impacts.

**The Distinction between the Financial and the Economic**
Some commented that from a progressive perspective, we should see the roots of the crisis as lying in the real economy, not the financial system. There was a sense that the G20 was too focused on finance, and that we should be working to make finance more functional in serving the real economy.

**Micro-Prudential vs. Macro-Prudential Regulation**
Some noted that while we are currently focused on advancing micro-prudential regulations (focuses on risk factors as they relate to an individual institution), crises cannot be prevented without a macro-prudential response (focused on systemic risks, for example, the risk of failure by one party due to the failure of a close financial associate). Some noted that global credit regulation is problematic, as countries should have the freedom to use credit for different things, including stimulating development. This necessarily means changing the entire regulatory paradigm, not simply strengthening the existing regulatory system in countries. Micro-prudential regulations still have a place, but won’t prevent future crises on their own. In this vein, it was felt that the G20 would not be able to overcome potential ‘regulatory chaos’ because it only captures the interests and needs of a small set of national economies, and does not consider the diverse interests of a broader range of economies nor the broader macro-prudential risks. A formalized process to reach out to non-member states, and also gain regional perspectives, might help better articulate the macro-prudential needs for global reform.

**Visions for the Future:**
The group supported expanding our own internal discussions on these issues beyond a handful of knowledgeable experts, to a broader range of civil society groups who can bring expertise on a different range of issues, still with links to finance and economics. One core challenge is to identify issues that have ‘traction’.

Many also felt that with Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea all implementing different types of capital controls in recent months, looking ahead to Seoul there could be movement on the issue of capital controls – something on which many people indicated an interest in working.

For France, with the prospect of an agriculture ministers meeting in March 2011 in France in the
lead up to the G8, some people felt that there was growing traction on commodity speculation. Targeting Universities to divest from commodity index bonds was a possible potential target. Sarkozy has also expressed some support on the question of a global reserve system and global imbalances.

More generally, others liked the idea of framing what a responsible financial system could look like. What measures and controls do we need to put in place? Working to frame such a system should challenge the notion of ‘financial efficiency’ (chained to the market), and instead propose a financial system oriented toward (low carbon) growth with equity, drawing clear distinctions between protection and protectionism and taking a broader view of macroeconomic stability.

Others pointed to the push for regulation, and questioned whether we need more regulation or rather better national regulatory oversight. The key in many cases is how well regulators use existing regulations. People thought creating an automatic and periodic review of existing regulations would be useful at the national/global level.

BUILDING A BRIDGE TO SOUTH KOREA
Sharing of experiences and best practices
The meeting in Canada was in part geared towards bringing groups from G20 countries (and beyond) together to strategize on how to start working together around the G20 and developing best practice for a possible Civil G20. To a large extent, much of the work around the G20 will still be done at the national level, and national priorities and agendas in one country may not overlap with those in other countries. But some level of coordination between groups and networks in different G20 countries and beyond was seen as important and useful. A key element of this would be to build on past experiences and strengthen the network of organizations focusing internationally on G20-related issues. If repeated, regular civil society meetings could help create a “triumvirate” of resource and reference people actively engaged from the CSO side on past, present and future G20 Summits – in this case from the 2009 (Pittsburgh and London), 2010 (Toronto and Seoul) and 2011 Summits (France), and engage representatives from key networks in the different G20 countries and beyond. This portion of the meeting offered an opportunity to share best practices from past and current summits.

United Kingdom
There was a discussion of Put People First, a successful campaign that wrapped up last year in the UK. PPF was helped by two key factors – a centre-left government in power willing to engage frankly with the campaign, and an extensive coalition of development NGOs and unions interested and engaged in the issues. The campaign and the policy platform took a significant amount of time to put together, which is important for future national campaigns to keep in mind as they prepare for upcoming summits (this was the case in the US and Canada as well).

There were some weaknesses in the campaign - it failed to link effectively with organizations engaged in domestic social and economic issues, and at least initially, there was fairly weak media interest. Given the diversity of interests in the very broad coalition, it was difficult to develop a strong media strategy and a clear message. Some other potential lessons for summit campaigners in South Korea might include avoiding being co-opted by the government, given the close ties many development NGOs have to the government. This means being wary that shared interests and policy demands don’t simply feed the government’s agenda.
United States
The Pittsburgh Summit in September posed a number of challenges. The city is relatively small and remote, which made it difficult to mobilize a broad network of CSOs. Overall the summit suffered from a lack of civil society coordination, and events were not well attended. However, there were a number of successful educational events as well as successful International Trade Union Confederation strategic side meetings with heads of state.

Guests like Joseph Stiglitz helped to attract some sorely needed media attention, although grassroots groups did not get much coverage compared to Stiglitz himself. A highlight was that Stiglitz was brought to the heart of a poor black neighbourhood in Pittsburg. This helped build bridges and make some local and global linkages that is sorely lacking in a lot of our work on the crisis. Overall most CSOs were disappointed by the lack of access to press, who were essentially cordoned off from most NGOs. The media situation in Pittsburgh was cited as being quite poor in general.

On the finance ministers meeting in Washington last April, groups exploited this strategic opportunity to draw attention to the FTT by getting representatives from other governments to speak about the FTT in the US. Organizations were also involved in IMF consultations on the FTT, which had an impact, which lead to the IMF confirming the technical feasibility of an FTT. There has been some success in coordinating individual meetings with G8/G20 sherpas on the FTT, and others may want to try to organize similar discussions on other issues.

Canada
Canadian CSOs began bringing together coalitions and networks around the G8/G20 about a year and half ago and spent approximately 6 months working on a policy platform. The platform focused on the MDGs, climate change, and the financial crisis. The platform was endorsed by over 60 organizations and is fairly lengthy as each organization in the coalition wanted their issue addressed. That said, the platform was extremely useful as an organizing tool. Within the coalition, smaller sub-committees were set up to work on political engagement, public education (i.e. the At the Table Campaign) and media.

Attempts to meet with the Prime Minister (PM) to discuss the agenda were unsuccessful (the current Conservative government in Canada is not open to input from civil society), but opposition parties and parliamentary committees were more open to discussion. Canada traditionally holds parliamentary hearings in the run-up to G8 summits and the resulting recommendations feed into the government’s agenda. This provides a good forum to voice CSO concerns, but the group was not able to get the Committee to agree to a hearing. As an alternative to this, the campaign organized parliamentary roundtables with experts on climate, finance and the MDGs, and invited critics from all parties to participate in the discussion. On international issues, many of the parties do not have well-defined agendas, so groups saw this as an opportunity to help shape the party’s policy agendas and include some of our issues.

While the PM’s office did shut out most CSOs, there were other opportunities to meet with government officials, including the sherpa team. Some groups had ongoing meetings with the team, and were able to shape some of the communiqué language. The Canadian network also maintained a common website with G8/G20 information, and made use of Google listservs to disseminate information and googledocs to work on collaborative documents. In addition, CSOs were successful in organizing a People’s Summit, and various protests and marches in the city.
Korea: Overview of the July meeting – what is planned, what is needed

South Korea’s political situation has changed recently and the country now has a conservative government. They are largely neo-liberal, focused on attracting investment and large development projects. The media largely serves the government’s interests. Most development NGOs are supported 100 percent by the government and therefore not overly critical. The government looks at the G20 summit as an opportunity to increase South Korea’s profile on the world stage and will treat it like a “national festival”. Korea is the first non-G8 country to host a G20 meeting at the leader’s level, CSOs are conscious of this and are attempting to remain independent and present a more critical platform of demands.

On June 18th Korean civil society launched the People’s G20 Response Preparation Committee, an umbrella group for addressing the G20 in November, with four main action principles:

1. Denounce the G20 for making people in developing countries pay for the crisis and criticize the structural problems of neoliberal financial globalization
2. Denounce the South Korean government for using the G20 as an excuse to repress democracy and human rights and ignore labour standards.
3. Maintain political, organizational and financial independence from the government and capital so as to organize the alternative voices of labour and civil society against the G20
4. Strengthen solidarity with local and international labour, social and civil society movements, working to build an environmentally friendly alternative economy with capital controls and to strengthen the capacity of international movements against neoliberal globalization

The main role of the committee is to organize the Joint Action week from November 6th to 13th involving G20 and non-G20 actors. The plan is to encourage thematic activities that strengthen Korea’s response to the G20, organize and strengthen social forces to join the people’s G20 actions, and organize activities on current/emerging G20 issues. There are also plans to stage a mass rally near the summit venue, which is located in an affluent neighbourhood in the southern part of Seoul. The government, however, is expected to block access to the area. That said, events will be held as close to the site as possible.

Ahead of the Summit, in July, the Korea Civil Society Network on Financial Reform is organizing an International Workshop as an opportunity to increase Korean CSO capacity and expertise on core G20 agenda items. CSOs in Korea need to develop and strengthen their networking capacity and share information and intelligence. Experienced CSO representatives from abroad have been invited to this workshop to help South Korean NGOs, trade unions and civil society actors develop a common strategy.

GCAP Korea is involved in the Stand up MDG Campaign in the context of the G20 summit process. GCAP is going to use the G20 meeting to raise the profile of the MDGs to national and regional CSOs. It is also playing a facilitating role in organizing the Seoul Civil Society G20 Dialogue with Sherpas, tentatively scheduled for mid-October.

While South Koreans have an incredible capacity for getting people out onto the street, the challenge for groups is to determine what kind of action is going to have the most impact (insider vs. outsider). In Seoul, the outside strategy has an enormous capacity, and the focus thus far has been in this area. Work may be needed on insider strategies - some noted that the government has chosen its own ‘insiders’, and it will be necessary to strengthen CSO insider strategies on finance and capital controls. Insider strategies are important in that those with
France Update:
The political context in France presents unique opportunities for the 2011 summit. 2012 is an election year, which means the summits will be very important to Sarkozy, who will want to boost his image internationally and secure a legacy. CSOs in France have cultivated close networks with the government. However, again like in South Korea, there is a danger that groups could be co-opted. Sarkozy’s challenger for the Presidency could also have different proposals, which could complicate things.

The G8 will be held in June in Nice in June (?), the G20 will be held in November in either Nice or Cannes. The G20 finance ministers meeting will be in either January or February, the G8 agriculture ministers’ meeting in March, and a G8 foreign ministers and development meeting will be held sometime in 2011. One of the main focuses of the French Presidency is on world food markets, so this may be a good area to focus on at the G20 agricultural ministers meeting – commodities and commodity speculation. France also thinks the G20 should address development issues, the MDGs and aid (in contrast to Canada, who wants a narrow focus on financial issues). The French Summit may also be a unique opportunity to campaign publicly on the FTT, an idea that Sarkozy supports. That said, much work still needs to be done to raise the public’s awareness about the FTT. There is also likely to be a big focus on tax havens.

The government is open to working with civil society to organize a dialogue on the summit agenda. French CSOs are developing a common platform on these issues, and would like to see other G20 countries step up their official development assistance. That said, civil society in France has been slow to mobilize around the upcoming summits, and are not overly aware of the G20 summit issues, so it will be necessary to do some capacity building. ATTAC and Coordination Sud, the trade unions and different smaller networks are already doing this, but much of the focus is on domestic issues. French groups are planning to set up a secretariat, a website and information newsletter, various workshops and a Civil G20.

Needs assessment for South Korea: How can civil society groups contribute towards the civil society G20 summit process in South Korea?
In terms of support that international CSOs could lend, some South Korean representatives said that one of the best ways to help would be to pressure national governments to be critical of the South Korean development agenda and aid policies (focused on private sector investment and development overseas).

Existing regulations in South Korea make public meetings difficult. So South Korean CSOs asked groups in G20 or non-G20 countries to pressure the Korean government to respect free speech and civil liberties by organizing demonstrations outside Korean embassies. Demonstrating international support for Korean civil society would be helpful.

The South Korean representatives are hoping to have a more concrete policy platform by September which they agreed to share internationally, allowing international CSOs to put pressure on other G20 governments on these issues ahead of the summit. Groups are also organizing an international meeting in Seoul in September to help coordinate common actions at the G20 summit, and if they reach a consensus, will provide more information on this as soon as possible.
GCAP Korea will assist in facilitating the Civil G20 meeting currently scheduled for mid-October. The CCFD and Coordination Sud offered to work with Korean colleagues on this if they needed any assistance, and to also help build a bridge towards the French summit.

South Korean groups are hoping that international partners will participate in as many of the activities that are being planned as possible. This includes providing financial support to bring people and resources to Korea, especially from Asia and North America.

**Meeting Outcomes:**
- Participants pledged their support to those organizing future activities on the G20 summits.
- Korean groups agreed to organize a conference call following their September meetings to inform groups about developments, to begin engaging groups keen to get engaged in the plans in South Korea and to further determine what kind of support is needed for Seoul;
- The Halifax Initiative will post the concept note, meeting agenda, copies of the presentation slides and final report on its website;
- HI will expand the mapping document and post it as a google document so that details can be updated regularly;
- HI will update its calendar of upcoming activities to include events discussed at the meeting;
- A list of focal points and resource people in national, regional and international networks working on G20 issues will be posted as a google document with a link from the HI web site;
- Fraser has gathered some of the messaging from the meeting and will use it at the upcoming G20 summit in interviews with media – some people offered to review the text.

**Information and Intelligence Sharing Going Forward:**
The following are resources for sharing information on relevant issues:

- Kel Currah of the G8 G20 Working Group organizes conference calls to share intelligence and information. They occur every three weeks on Wednesdays at 11:30 GMT.
- The Global Crises and Alternative G20 listservs are great ways to circulate information and intelligence to an extensive network of people. HI manages the global crises listserv and will add all the participants in this meeting to the list.