Mining

PT Inco Nickel Mine and Smelter

Indonesia
Inco Ltd.
EDC: loans of $60 and $200 million[1]
CPP: $130 million[2]

For thirty years Inco enjoyed a cozy relationship with the repressive and corrupt Suharto regime.[3]

Members of the Karonsi’e Dongi and Sorowako indigenous communities lost their most productive agricultural land when the PT Inco mine was built, and they received paltry compensation in return.[4] Mining activity has degraded land and water resources,[5] and initial monitoring suggests that smelter emissions affect air quality in neighbouring communities.[6] Despite apparent efforts by Inco to resolve community claims in recent years, protesting residents report being threatened and intimidated by the Indonesian military and police.[7]

Goro Nickel Mine

Kanaky-New Caledonia
Inco Ltd.
CPP: $130 million[1]

Home to the world’s greatest barrier reef system, largest lagoon, and unique plant and animal species, Kanaky-New Caledonia is a biodiversity hotspot.[2] This biological treasure-trove may be irrevocably damaged if mining giant Inco moves ahead with plans for a massive open pit mine. Arguing that they were not consulted, native Kanaks oppose further construction - citing the project’s potential social and environmental impacts.[3] The Kanaks’ concerns are credible - in 2006, erosion controls employed by the company failed, contaminating an important marine protected area.[4] In June 2006, an administrative tribunal responded to a complaint by the Kanak organization, Rheebu Nuu, by canceling Goro’s mining license, arguing that the project’s potential environmental impacts had not been adequately studied.[5] The company is appealing the decision,[6] but has proceeded with mine development, relying on a separate construction permit.[7]

Uktal Bauxite Mine and Alumina Refinery

India
Alcan Inc.
CPP: $256 million[1]

Thousands of tribal and low-caste people living in Kashipur, India prefer to die rather than abandon their lands to make way for Alcan’s proposed mine and refinery.[2] Local residents have organized massive mobilizations against the project.[3] Opponents describe a climate of fear and hostility, and claim that they routinely meet with police repression.[4] In 2000, three protesters were killed and several others injured.[5] Alcan suspended operations after the incident until it was satisfied that local authorities would responsibly enforce the law and keep order.[6] The villagers have found an important ally in Canada. Alcan workers in British Columbia, represented by the Canadian Auto Workers union, have vowed that they will not smelt any alumina originating from Kashipur.[7] 

Omai Gold Mine

Guyana
Cambior Inc. and Golden Star Resources Ltd.
EDC:
$163 million political risk insurance[1]
MIGA:
reinsured $55 million
CPP:
$21 million (Cambior)
$14 million (Golden Star)[2]

The now infamous, massive tailings dam failure at the Omai mine occurred in August 1995. Millions of cubic metres of heavy metal laden mine waste spilled into the Essequibo River, the country’s main waterway. Large fish kills were reported and the government declared the area a disaster zone. Amerindian indigenous people living along the banks of the Essequibo claimed major fish losses, contamination of freshwater supplies and adverse health effects, as a result of the spill. A class action lawsuit on behalf of affected Guyanese was thrown out by a Quebec court, which denied the Guyanese plaintiffs standing.[3]

Marlin Gold and Silver Mine

Guatemala
Glamis Gold Ltd.
IFC: US$45 million loan
CPP: $63 million[1]

Marlin, which became operational in 2005, is the first major mining investment in Guatemala in 20 years[2] and is an important test case. In January 2005, the break-up of a 40-day protest by the army resulted in one death.[3] Later that year, indigenous Sipacapan communities affected by the mine overwhelmingly rejected mineral development in a popular referendum.[4] In response to a community complaint, the World Bank’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) investigated the project. While the CAO found that some community concerns, particularly those involving impacts to local water supplies, were unwarranted, the CAO identified some serious shortcomings with project assessment and management. For example, the CAO described the lack of a clear policy on human rights as a “significant oversight” on the part of both Glamis and the IFC.[5]

Simiti Gold Mine

Colombia

Conquistador Mines Ltd.
 

The town of Simiti, in northern Colombia, is the site of a gold mine whose ownership is a matter of dispute. The mine is claimed by both the Higuera-Palacios family and the 35,000 poor miners who have worked the deposit for 30 years. In 1997, at roughly the same time that Conquistador, through its subsidiary Corona Goldfields, expressed interest in the Simiti mine, paramilitaries began to appear in the area. They killed at least 19 people in towns around Simiti, beheaded one miner, and tortured and killed the Vice-President of a local miners association. Fearing for their lives, thousands of people fled the area. According to Francisco Ramirez, President of the Colombian Mine Workers Union, the death squads’ purpose was to displace small-scale miners in order to make way for foreign capital. Conquistador has since abandoned the project.[1]

Dikulushi Copper and Silver Mine

Democratic Republic of Congo

Anvil Mining Ltd.
MIGA: US$13.3 million political risk insurance[1]
CPP: $4 million[2]

Brutal conflict, fuelled by the country’s extraordinary mineral wealth, officially ended in 2003 with the establishment of a transitional government. While a fragile peace has held since then, tensions remain high and the government lacks control over large tracts of the country.[3] The Dikulushi mine began production in 2002. Two years later, Anvil provided logistical support to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) to suppress a rebel uprising. The company supplied the FARDC with planes, vehicles, personnel and food.[4] According to a UN mission, the FARDC utilized these resources to carry out a number of human rights abuses, including alleged summary executions.[5] 

Pascua Lama Gold Mine

Chile
Barrick Gold Corp.
CPP:
$351 million[1]

The Pascua Lama gold deposit is located high in the Andes, in an area rich with glaciers. Glacial run-off irrigates the productive Huasco valley, an agricultural centre just south of the Atacama desert.[2] Barrick’s original plan to relocate portions of several glaciers[3] was met with public outcry and was rejected by the Chilean government. Barrick now claims that it can extract the gold without damaging the glaciers or significantly impacting water resources in the valley.[4] However, a government report reveals that exploration activity may already have caused significant damage to several glaciers.[5] The Indigenous Diaguita community of Huasco-Altino claims that the concession includes part of its ancestral territory and is suing to recover the land.[6]

Don Mario Gold Mine

Bolivia
Orvana Minerals Corp.
IFC: issued loans to and held equity in COMSUR,[1] a Bolivian company that was an Orvana shareholder until 2005[2]

The Don Mario mine is located in the heart of the Chiquitano Dry Forest.[3] This rare, globally significant ecosystem supports the headwaters of the Pantanal wetlands and is home to numerous endemic species.[4]  The Pantanal is one of the world’s largest freshwater ecosystems, recognized by UNESCO and the Ramsar Convention.[5]  The area is also of great cultural, economic and social importance to the Chiquitano indigenous people.[6]  In a complaint filed with the World Bank’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, an indigenous organization argued that the mine violates the rights of over 7000 indigenous communities.[7] Among other shortcomings, the ombudsman found that indigenous people were not adequately consulted by the project proponents.[8]

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