Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

Monthly Issue Update - November 30, 2006

Groundswell of Interest in Canadian Overseas Extractive Operations
This month the Government of Canada’s final roundtable on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries was held in Montreal (see April 2006, Issue update). In order to accommodate public demand, more time was dedicated to public sessions in the November roundtable than in any of the previous consultations. Roundtable participants heard diverse perspectives from an impressive range of stakeholders. An Indonesian speaker described how her community is affected by the operations of a Canadian mining company. John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on business and human rights also addressed roundtable participants.

Kumtor Gold Mine

Kyrgyzstan
Cameco Corp.
EDC:
US$50 million political risk insurance [1]
EBRD:
US$40 million loan [2]
IFC:
US$40 million loan [3]
MIGA:
US$45 million political risk insurance [4]
CPP:
$35 million [5]

In May 1998, a company truck spilt a load of sodium cyanide, a chemical used to extract gold, into the Barskoun River, raising the cyanide concentration in the water to 50,000 times the permissible level.[6] In the days following the spill, hundreds, possibly thousands of local residents sought medical attention and several deaths were reported. Thousands were evacuated from the spill area.[7] A study published by Natural Resources Canada [8] concluded that few, if any, significant environmental impacts were generated by the spill - conclusions that were questioned by an independent hydrogeologist.[9]

Omai Gold Mine

Guyana
Cambior Inc. and Golden Star Resources Ltd.
EDC:
$163 million political risk insurance[1]
MIGA:
reinsured $55 million
CPP:
$21 million (Cambior)
$14 million (Golden Star)[2]

The now infamous, massive tailings dam failure at the Omai mine occurred in August 1995. Millions of cubic metres of heavy metal laden mine waste spilled into the Essequibo River, the country’s main waterway. Large fish kills were reported and the government declared the area a disaster zone. Amerindian indigenous people living along the banks of the Essequibo claimed major fish losses, contamination of freshwater supplies and adverse health effects, as a result of the spill. A class action lawsuit on behalf of affected Guyanese was thrown out by a Quebec court, which denied the Guyanese plaintiffs standing.[3]

Dikulushi Copper and Silver Mine

Democratic Republic of Congo

Anvil Mining Ltd.
MIGA: US$13.3 million political risk insurance[1]
CPP: $4 million[2]

Brutal conflict, fuelled by the country’s extraordinary mineral wealth, officially ended in 2003 with the establishment of a transitional government. While a fragile peace has held since then, tensions remain high and the government lacks control over large tracts of the country.[3] The Dikulushi mine began production in 2002. Two years later, Anvil provided logistical support to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) to suppress a rebel uprising. The company supplied the FARDC with planes, vehicles, personnel and food.[4] According to a UN mission, the FARDC utilized these resources to carry out a number of human rights abuses, including alleged summary executions.[5] 

Event: 2006 National Roundtables - June 14 - November 16, 2006

Background | Roundtable Process | When and Where | How to Participate | Monthly Updates


Background
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) tabled, in June 2005, a landmark report on Mining in Developing Countries and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

The report recommended that the Canadian government move away from its current voluntary approach to CSR. It called for policies that condition public assistance for Canadian companies on compliance with international human rights and environmental standards, including core labour rights. The report also identified the need for legislation to hold companies accountable for their actions overseas.

The Government failed to adopt the majority of SCFAIT’s recommendations, but it did commit to hosting a series of national roundtables. These Roundtables were to identify ways for Canadian extractive companies to meet or exceed international CSR standards and best practices.

Report - Analysis of the Finance Report on BWIs, 2005 - June 2, 2006

PDF of Full Report available here

Nous regrettons qu'en 2006, l'initiative d'Halifax n'a pas produit de version Francaise.

Report Card on the Canadian Department of Finance “2005 Report on Operations Under Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act”


Introduction
Every year at the end of March,[1] the Department of Finance tables its report on the operations of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) [2] before Parliament and details activities at these institutions in relation to Canadian priorities, commitments and interests. The reports provide some good background information on the institutions themselves, on emerging issues and challenges within the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and some brief details on Canadian priorities and financial participation at these institutions.

Press Release - Monday, February 9, 2004

High Level World Bank Review calls for the phase out of World Bank involvement in oil exploitation and coal mining

Bank Management to ignore recommendations says leaked report

(Ottawa) February 9th, 2004 -- Conforming to industry’s desires, the World Bank management is pushing to have its Board of Directors reject the recommendations of an independent review of its performance in the oil, coal, and mining sectors, according to a leaked report. The World Bank’s Management Response to the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) was leaked last week.

Speech on the Role of IFIs in Privatization - Commonwealth Foundation

Commonwealth Foundation
Brunei Darasalaam
July 22nd, 2003

The Role of IFIs
Pamela Foster
Halifax Initiative Coalition

I may have been asked to give this talk as I, among our Commonwealth colleagues, sit closest to Washington. As there is so much experience in the room in addressing issues of the World Bank and the IMF[1], I will merely start a list of all the ways that the IFIs are implicated in the relentless drive towards privatization of public assets.

First, I would like to quickly share two contextual comments regarding this push towards privatization. It must be situated within the drive towards the end of history, or the ultimate global supremacy of US-modeled capitalism. This victory was declared at the end of the Cold War. The end of history envisions the role of the state being limited to maintaining law and order and a sound investment climate.

CSO letter to World Bank President re CAO report on Bulyanhulu mine

December 12, 2002

Mr. James Wolfensohn
President
The World Bank Group
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433 U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Wolfensohn,

We are writing to express dismay at the recent Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman report on the MIGA guarantee of the Bulyanhulu gold mine and to request your urgent intervention.

The CAO is a mechanism that non-governmental organizations have pushed hard to establish. Your personal support for the initiative played a major role in ensuring that the CAO was established. As all parties have observed, the CAO's effectiveness rests on the respect and trust it enjoys amongst the public: integrity, transparency, even¬handedness and thoroughness are thus critical to all aspects of its work.

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